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Abstract
This paper presents a model of private bilateral and multilateral peering
arrangements between Internet backbone providers when the network is
congested. We study how diﬀerent forms of interconnection and the com-
petitive conditions of the market aﬀect backbones’ investments in network
and peering point infrastructures. We show that networks and peering
point capacities are equilibrium complements; increasing competition reduces
capacity investments (under-investment), thus worsening the quality of
service both with multilateral and bilateral peering. Under bilateral peering
the ineﬃciency is less severe. Because of under-investment, welfare may be
lower when the market is more competitive. We also show that asymmetries
between backbones, which can take the form of unequal content distribution
or product diﬀerentiation, may reduce under-investment and improve the
quality of service. The introduction of an ”inverse capacity interconnection
fee” where providers pay each other a fee which is negatively correlated
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towards a Pareto superior outcome.
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01 Introduction
The Federal Communications Commission reports that on the Internet the volume
of traﬃc is doubling every 100 days, which is remarkable given that telephone traﬃc
has typically increased only by about 5 percent a year. Estimates on the number
of U.S. households that are connected to the Internet show an increase up to 60
million in 2003 (Carmel et al., 1999); Europe and the other continents are actually
lagging behind but as long as populations will gain access, it is likely that in the next
few years these countries will experience an intense growth rate in the number of
Internet access. At the same time, due to a proliferation of data intensive real-time
applications such as Internet telephony, instant messaging and video conferencing,
this substantial growth in general demand for access is accompanied by an intense
increase in demand for broadband, high-quality access to the Internet.
Although the transmission capacity of the international Internet backbone has
increased at a fast rate in the last few years, the rapid growth in demand for access
combined with the increase in the demand for broadband applications are actually
creating congestion of network’s infrastructures, usually measured in terms of either
excessive delay or loss of service altogether.1 Furthermore, the transmission proto-
col adopted for the Internet and its infrastructures was not designed for delivering
continuous speech or videos; for this reason the control of congestion and the re-
lated issue of ”quality of service” (usually referred as QoS) have become two major
concerns on the Internet both at the theoretical and practical level.2
The issue of congestion is tightly linked with that of interconnection. Providers
compete against each other in the market for individual ”surfers” but, at the same
time, they are in various way interconnected in order to oﬀer global connectivity.
Clearly, the way in which providers interconnect and/or how they share common
infrastructures aﬀects the degree of congestion of their networks and the QoS that
they are able to oﬀer.
Congestion can be roughly deﬁned as the amount of traﬃc per unit of transmis-
sion infrastructures; the most direct way that providers have to mitigate network
congestion is through improving their transmission capacity. The aim of the pa-
per is to analyse the relationship between networks interconnection, congestion and
providers’ incentives to expand capacity in order to improve the quality of their
1There are many web sites oﬀering real time measures of the reliability of Internet connections.
See, for example, the Internet Traﬃc Report (ITR) web site where the ﬂow of data around the
world is constantly monitored. In order to provide a measure of the current level of congestion of
the world wide web, ITR oﬀers measures of packet loss at each router and an index of the response
time of transmissions (see www.internettrafficreport.com).
2Although there is no general deﬁnition, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
deﬁnes a number of QoS parameters to describe the speed and reliability of data transmission,
e.g., throughput, transit delay and error rate.
1services.
Before proceeding with the model, it is useful to discuss brieﬂy the issues at
stake. These are described in the next section where we also oﬀer a short synthesis
of our results. Section 3 presents the basics of the model and formally deﬁnes the
concepts of traﬃc and congestion; section 4 and 5 discuss and compare congestion
under diﬀerent forms of interconnection. Section 6 extends further the model to the
case of product diﬀerentiation and discusses interconnection charges while section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Background and main results
Together with several technological innovations, a growing attention has been di-
rected towards the deﬁnition of distribution mechanisms, primarily pricing mech-
anisms, in order to provide the eﬃcient use of network’s scarce resources. The
literature on how to price congestible network resources is by now quite well de-
veloped; the proposed solutions range from the simple use of ﬂat pricing to very
complicated approaches based on auctions over packets,3 to the use of multi-class
service pricing4 or on static and dynamic priority pricing.5
A full survey of the various proposals of congestion pricing is beyond the scope
of this paper.6 At a theoretical level, these pricing schemes may alleviate congestion
and also induce an eﬃcient allocation of resources; nevertheless, the use of pric-
ing mechanisms to control congestion requires the individuals’ usage of resources to
be constantly monitored and billed at the various nodes where packets’ transmis-
sion occurs. Internet traﬃc ”accountability” is both extremely costly and diﬃcult
to realise with the current network management technology and this often makes
congestion prices more a theoretical than a practical issue.
3This is the well known approach proposed by MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995a,b); they
introduce a smart market pricing where, prior to transmission, users inform the network on how
much they are willing to pay for the transmission of a packet: the network runs an auction which
takes account of the marginal congestion cost of an extra packet and accepts only those packets
with a bid that exceeds this marginal cost.
4This scheme was originally proposed in Odlyzko (1997 and 1999) and then reﬁned by Gibbens
et al. (1998 and 2000); Odlyzko’s proposal is based on the pricing of the Paris Metro: the total
network capacity is divided into several sub-networks. Each network is priced diﬀerently; the
service level is implicitly deﬁned by users that select one of the sub-networks according to their
willingness to pay.
5Priority pricing schemes are schemes that force users to indicate the value of their traﬃc
by selecting a priority level and to pay according to the priority. These pricing policies may be
dynamic if prices ﬂuctuate as a result of diﬀerent network conditions. See Cocchi et al. (1993) and
Gupta, Sthal and Winston (1995, 1996 and 1997).
6See Wiseman (2000), DaSilva (2000) and Falkner (2000) et al. for non technical discussions of
current proposals.
2Pricing mechanisms act on the demand side of the market; the alternative, and
more direct way to ameliorate congestion and to improve the quality of service, is to
act on the supply side. This may be done indirectly, implementing new technologies
such us ”caching”, which can eﬀectively reduce congestion through traﬃc aggrega-
tion,7 or directly, by expanding network infrastructures. In this paper we focus on
this latter alternative.
Clearly, a provider endowed with more capacity, is generally able to oﬀer a
better QoS to its customers. Very few papers have analysed the incentive to expand
capacity by Internet backbone providers; MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995a) present
a model of individual demand for access to the Internet with congestion which takes
the form of a negative network externality: individuals’ willingness to pay for access
decreases with network congestion, with this latter positively related to the number
of individuals having access to the Internet and negatively to providers’ capacity. In
a very simple framework, the authors show that with perfect competition between
providers, the socially eﬃcient level of capacity is achieved. As a consequence, in
order to induce both an eﬃcient utilization of resources and an adequate level of
investment in transmission capacity it is suﬃcient to promote competition between
backbone providers.
Nevertheless, this result heavily depends on the assumption that the degree of
congestion suﬀered by a provider depends only on the amount of its customers and
capacity and not on those of the rivals. This is a very strong limitation which
also drives the model away from what we observe in the reality where backbone
providers do not generally operate in isolation: providers not only compete against
each other but they need also to ﬁnd a way to collaborate in order to interconnect
their infrastructures and to provide global connectivity to their respective customers.
Backbone providers are private ﬁrms that own and operate large capacity links,
routers and switching equipments. These ﬁrms connect at the so called public peering
points, also known as Network Access Points (NAP), where the traﬃc between
customers of diﬀerent providers is processed, routed and redirected to its destination.
The term ”peering” indicates a settlement free interconnection between
providers. Following Weiss and Shin (2001), peering arrangements can be divided
into three categories: 1) according to the openness of the agreement, peering can be
public when anyone can join it,8 or private otherwise, 2) according to the number
of the peering partners it can be bilateral or multilateral and 3) according to the
market in which it occurs, it can be primary peering between backbone providers
7Caches come in many types, but they all work the same way: they store information where it
can be accessed quickly. A web browser cache stores the pages, graphics, sounds, and URL’s of
online places visited by an individual on his/her hard drive. When the customer goes back to the
page, everything doesn’t have to be downloaded all over again. This speeds things up.
8The only requirement is that each partner pays for the equipment needed to interconnect at
the peering point.
3or secondary peering if it occurs in the downstream market.9
In this paper we concentrate only on the second category and focus on the charac-
teristics of bilateral vs multilateral private peering. Private peering has emerged in
recent years as a way to avoid the very congested public peering points; originally,
at the beginning of the commercial Internet, there were only four public peering
points10 and networks exchanged traﬃc bound for each other’s destinations at these
sites only; although these points have so far guaranteed global connectivity, given
the rapid growth in Internet traﬃc, the NAPs became soon congested, leading to
delayed and dropped packets.
In order to avoid transmission delays and failures, backbones started to get
around the public peering points and to interconnect directly with one another sign-
ing bilateral/multilateral private peering arrangements.11 Thanks to these private
arrangements, providers are now able to exchange directly reciprocal oﬀ-net traﬃc.
It is estimated that 80% of the traﬃc is now exchanged via private peering.12
Usually, these private peering points are run on a quid pro quo basis and fre-
quently they permit traﬃc exchange free of charge.13 There isn’t a clear rule that
governs private peering; the term ”peer” suggests equality of treatment and, usu-
ally, backbones decide to set a private peering point when they are ”similar in size”.
This is a very broad deﬁnition; more precisely, providers may peer when they have
a similar geographic coverage, similar traﬃc volume or similar number of customers
and also when they have similar capacity. Clearly, it is very unlikely that two back-
bones are similar along so many dimensions, and the question then is how backbones
weight one dimension against the other.
When two providers interconnect, they agree to share their infrastructures and to
exchange reciprocal traﬃc; having observed this, the main eﬀect of an interconnec-
tion agreement is to make the degree of congestion incurred by a provider no longer
independent from the level of congestion of the interconnected rival. An example
may help to understand this crucial point: when an individual downloads a docu-
ment from a certain web site which is hosted on a diﬀerent provider, the ”sending”
9The Internet has a hierarchical structure and it is usually broken down into diﬀerent layers or
tiers: tier 1 providers’ are those that have access to the global Internet Routing Table and that
provide international connectivity. Examples include UUNet, Cable & Wireless, Sprint, Qwest,
Genuity and AT&T. The second tier includes smaller providers, usually those with national pres-
ence while tier 3 providers are players with only a regional presence and no national backbone.
Secondary peering occurs between providers of tiers 2 and 3.
10They were set up in San Francisco, Chicago, New York and Washington D.C.
11For a complete non technical discussion of the evolution of peering arrangements, see Kende
(2000) and Bailey (1995).
12See Kende and Oxman (1999).
13When the agreement between providers involves a settlement payment, thus conﬁguring a
provider-customer relationship between them, then the agreement is known as traﬃc interconnec-
tion.
4and the ”receiving” providers are diﬀerent;14 in this case, the time needed to deliver
the document depends on the degree of congestion of both providers and possibly
on other factors if the transmission is routed through transit providers.
More generally, the level of congestion suﬀered by customers of a certain provider,
and the QoS they are oﬀered, is the result of a complex mix of factors which includes
the amount of capacity installed by all the providers involved in the transmission,
the structure of the interconnection agreements between these providers and, ﬁnally,
also the degree of competition between them.
It is therefore evident that the two issues of interconnection and congestion are
tightly linked together; the aim of this paper is to analyse these relationship and to
describe how the incentives for backbone providers to invest in transmission capacity
in order to oﬀer better QoS change with the type of interconnection agreement
between ﬁrms and with the competitive conditions of the market.
The analysis is conducted building on a recent contribution proposed by Dewan
et al. (2000). These authors present a simple and tractable model of private peering
arrangement in a duopoly setting. The originality of their approach is the way
in which they model interconnection: backbones interconnect at a common private
peering point where they exchange traﬃc bounded for each other destination. Firms
compete after having invested in their network capacity and in the capacity of the
common peering point; according to this framework, the degree of congestion on the
network of each provider depends also on the congestion on rivals’ network. The
authors focus mainly on the characteristics of the peering point and show that, due to
the negative congestion externality, the larger network (the one with more customers
and content) prefers to have a lower capacity for the private interconnection point.
We go further on this analysis by extending the model in two directions: we
solve for diﬀerent peering arrangements (bilateral vs multilateral) and for diﬀerent
competitive conditions of the market. We show that once the relationship between
interconnection and congestion is taken into account, the eﬃciency result of MacKie-
Mason and Varian does non longer apply. Transmission capacity is a public good
and as consequence there is a serious problem of under-investment, with competition
that reduces incentives for upgrading network capacities; this has a negative impact
on the quality of services and, therefore, on social welfare. We also show that under-
investment is less severe with bilateral peering and, generally, when providers are
somewhat diﬀerentiated either in their QoS or in the product they oﬀer to their
customers.
Although the focus is on pricing strategies, an interesting paper which spirit is
close to ours’ is Gupta et. al (1999); they run an experiment to analyse, in a monop-
olistic framework, the eﬀects of diﬀerent congestion based pricing on incentives for
14A transmission which is entirely controlled by the same provider is said ”end-to-end” trans-
mission; this is a situation which is rarely observed.
5network capacity expansion as the demand for services increases. Their results show
that the ability of a pricing scheme to provide incentives for capacity expansion is
strictly related to the cost of capacity and to the individuals’ willingness to pay for
network services. Nevertheless, since the model is restricted to monopoly, the issues
of interconnection and competition, which are our main focus, are not taken into
account.
3 The model
3.1 Demand for access and social surplus
Throughout the paper, we refer to backbones or providers and we will use these two
terms interchangeably; the market that we have in mind is the one between Internet
backbone providers, i.e. those operators providing international connectivity. Never
the less, with small changes, our model can be applied also to national Internet
service providers or to all those providers with backbone infrastructures.
There is an continuum population of consumers; each consumer is indexed by
his/her basic willingness to pay for having access to the Internet. Let the utility of
joining the Internet through provider i (i = 1;:::;n) enjoyed by consumer indexed
by r be
U = r ¡ Di ¡ pi r 2 [0;A]; A > 0
where r > 0 is a positive beneﬁt of joining the Internet which is uniformly dis-
tributed in [0;A], pi is the per unit time price charged by backbone i and Di is
the disutility (or dis-beneﬁt) of delay incurred by customers. While r is indepen-
dent from which backbone is providing access, the disutility of delay depends on
the degree of congestion on network i. Consumers are assumed heterogeneous in
their basic willingness to pay and homogeneous in the disutility of congestion. This
very simpliﬁed utility function assumes away service diﬀerentiation: for instance,
real-time voice and video applications are very sensitive to delay and jitter while
traditional data applications are more sensitive to losses.15 The only diﬀerentiation
between backbones comes from the degree of congestion, and it is not intrinsically
related to the type of services oﬀered; we will reintroduce product diﬀerentiation in
the last part of the paper
This functional form for utility implies two further assumptions. First, users
do not multihome, i.e. they join one and only one provider; secondly, users pay
a price per unit time of connection which does not depend on the volume of data
15See Cocchi et al. (1993) and Jiang and Jordan (1996) for a theoretical discussion. Recently
the project ”Internet Demand Experiment” (INDEX) conducted at the University of California at
Berkeley has attempted to experimentally characterise users behavior when confronted to diﬀer-
entiated services; preliminary results and implications are in Varian (2002).
6transmitted. These assumptions are taken to maintain model tractability, and we
believe that they do not imply a major loss of generality. In particular, the second
assumption, which is common in the literature,16 is reasonable when users generate
the same amount of traﬃc. In this simpliﬁed framework, subscription and usage
decisions coincide. This fact, combined with the assumption of linear prices, is also
consistent with the scope of our analysis that is to model the relationship between
congestion and interconnection policies when providers charge ﬂat prices.
There are n providers on the market. At the equilibrium, consumers must be
indiﬀerent between joining provider i and provider j; from the indiﬀerent condition:
pi + Di = pj + Dj 8j 6= j (1)
Let us call Á this ”hedonic” price. Only customers with r ¸ Á buy the connec-
tion, therefore at the equilibrium there is a total amount of consumers xt = A ¡ Á
connecting to the Internet. Hence, using (1), the demand function for ISP i is:
pi = A ¡ Di ¡ xt (2)
From the demand function we compute the consumers surplus. Total surplus
enjoyed by consumer of type r when she/he is a customer of ISP i is:
CS(r) = r ¡ Di ¡ pi (3)
where pi is given in (2). At the equilibrium, only those consumers with a basic
willingness to pay r bigger than Á = A ¡ xt join the network. Integrating (3) over









Social welfare is simply deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’
proﬁts: W = CS +
P
i ¼i; ¼i represents the proﬁt of ﬁrm i and it will be deﬁned
shortly, once the concepts of network traﬃc and congestion have been introduced.
3.2 On-net and oﬀ-net traﬃc
In order to characterise congestion, it is crucial to diﬀerentiate between on-net and
oﬀ-net traﬃc ﬂows.
There are mainly two categories of users on the Internet: sites/portals that place
their information content on the web (and for this reason they are often referred as
”content providers”) and individuals who ”consume” the information. Nowadays
16See Gibbens et al. (2000) among others.
785% and more of all Internet traﬃc is generated by receiver requests, such as web
page retrieval or downloading ﬁles;17 this implies that the request traﬃc generated
by individuals is generally very small compared to the traﬃc of web pages or ﬁle
downloads. Accordingly, without loss of generality we assume away to zero the
traﬃc ﬂow from individuals to content providers and we concentrate only on the
traﬃc from web sites to individuals.18
Consider an individual who downloads the content from a certain web site. The
web site and the individual may either be customers of the same provider or cus-
tomers belonging to diﬀerent operators. In the ﬁrst case, the ﬂow of information from
the web to the consumer goes entirely on the infrastructures of the same provider; for
this reason, this traﬃc is said on-net traﬃc. If, conversely, the consumer download-
ing the content and the web site oﬀering the content belong to diﬀerent providers,
then the traﬃc is said oﬀ-net since it is goes from a provider, the one hosting the
web site, to a diﬀerent one, the one where the consumer is located.
3.3 Private peering arrangements, traﬃc and congestion
Although very interesting, the aim of this paper is not to analyse when and why
providers decide to peer; we do not analyse the bargaining process that yields back-
bones to set up a point of interconnection but we assume that providers actually
agree to peer.19 Our aim is to analyse how diﬀerent interconnection arrangements
and market structures aﬀect providers’ incentives in mitigating congestion through
capacity investment. Each provider has its own infrastructures, routers and switches;
let ki be the capacity of provider i’s network. In addition to their own capacity,
providers invest in infrastructure and capacity to build the interconnection point.
We restrict the attention to the analysis of two types of arrangements which
are commonly observed: bilateral and multilateral peering. In the ﬁrst scenario,
each provider peers with any one on the market in a one-to-one relationship. Con-
versely, peering is said multilateral when more than two backbones peer. In the
reality, these two regimes often coexist; furthermore, other and more complex forms
of interconnection can be observed. For example, many backbones have adopted
a hybrid approach to interconnection, peering with some backbones and signing
17See Weiss and Shin (2001).
18This simplifying assumption is common in the literature on the Internet, see Laﬀont et
al.(2001a, 2001b).
19The characteristics of the bargaining process between Internet service providers have been
recently studied in Besen et al. (2001). These authors provide analytical support against the
conventional wisdom that large backbones may refuse to peer with smaller ones. They claim that
as the Internet develops a richer sets of interconnection arrangements such as secondary peering,
transit and multi-homing, the incentives of large backbones to refuse to enter into or degrade
peering arrangements will be reduced.
8”transit” agreements with others.20 Although our model does not encompass these
forms of interconnection arrangements, we believe that the approach we provide in
this paper represents a valid starting point to analyse these controversial issues.
The regimes that we present share three characteristics: i) providers who inter-
connect build a private peering point where reciprocal oﬀ-net traﬃc is exchanged, ii)
traﬃc is exchanged on a settlement-free basis and iii) the cost of building the peer-
ing point is equally divided among providers: each backbone pays for the equipment
and the transmission capacity needed to build the peering point.
It is useful to provide a graphical representation of the two regimes analysed in
the paper; suppose, for simplicity, that there are only 3 providers on the market:
ﬁgure 1 presents multilateral peering where backbones set up a common peering
point and ﬁgure 2 shows the bilateral peering scheme where each provider peers
with all the others. Let kp be the capacity of the multilateral peering point and k
j
p;i
the capacity of the peering point between provider j and provider i in the case of
bilateral arrangement. All through the paper, we indicate with K =
P
i ki the total
(own) capacity installed by providers.
We can now deﬁne formally the traﬃc ﬂows and the degree of congestion in
the two interconnection regimes; we generalise the model presented in Dewan et al.
(2000). All through the paper we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Let ®i 2 (0;1), with i = 1;:::;n, be the share of the total content
available on line hosted on provider i’s infrastructures, with
P
i ®i = 1.
In other words we assume exogenous the amount of content hosted by each
provider, which therefore compete only for individual users. Assumption 1 is taken
on practical grounds: while individuals can change provider very easily, businesses
and web sites incur in very high switching costs when changing provider. These
costs are mainly due to the need of adapting the technology and the architecture of
their sites to diﬀerent requirements when changing provider.
This assumption, which makes the approach a short period analysis, helps to
simplify the model considerably; nevertheless, in front of a little loss of generality,
we are able to characterise how the equilibrium of the model changes when content
distribution changes. This is a very interesting issue that we address in the paper.
Note that since individuals can download any of the content irrespective of
the provider they use to access the Net, asymmetric content distribution among
providers is not ”per-se” a form of providers’ product diﬀerentiation; nevertheless,
as it will become clear in the coming section, ®i aﬀects the traﬃc transmitted on
provider i’s infrastructures and therefore, through its impact on congestion, it is
indirectly a form of quality diﬀerentiation.
20In a transit relationship, if provider A is refused to peer with B, then it can take transit instead.












Figure 1: multilateral peering and traﬃc ﬂows
3.3.1 Traﬃc ﬂows and the level of congestion with multilateral peering
Consider now the multilateral peering framework. The total traﬃc on provider i’s
infrastructure positively depends on the amount of content available on the web sites
hosted by the same provider: the more content is available on provider i web sites,
the more users contact these sites and the higher the traﬃc carried on provider i’s
network.
Under the assumption that users download a ﬁxed amount of content (i.e. they
generate the same amount of traﬃc), then the total traﬃc carried on a given network,
ti, is proportional to the content hosted on the same network, ®i, and to the total
number of customers on-line xt. Therefore the total traﬃc on provider i’s network
is:
ti = ®ixt i = 1;:::;n (5)
ti may be higher either because there are more customers on-line or because
provider i hosts more content. Part of this traﬃc stays on-net and part goes oﬀ-
net; the latter depends on the amount of content hosted by the other providers
and is given by (1 ¡ ®i)xi, where xi represents provider’s i amount of customers.
The peering point gets all the cross traﬃc between networks; adding up this last




























Figure 2: bilateral peering and traﬃc ﬂows
We use these expressions to determine the delay suﬀered by customers on the
network of each provider. The delay, and therefore the QoS, that provider i is able
to oﬀer depends on the degree of congestion of its infrastructures. Broadly speaking,
the congestion of a network is proportional to the ratio between traﬃc t and capacity
k: for a given traﬃc, congestion is higher the less capacity is in place.
In this framework, the average (expected) delay suﬀered by an individual when
surﬁng the net is a combined measure of the congestion of his provider’s network
and the congestion at the peering point. Given that ki and kp are the capacities of
provider i’s network and of the peering point respectively, the average delay suﬀered


















where the superscript m stays for ”multilateral”. This expression simply states that
the delay/QoS oﬀered by provider i is an average between the delay incurred for
11on-net transmissions and for oﬀ-net transmissions, the former that depends only
on provider i’s own traﬃc and capacity, while the latter related to both rivals’ and
the peering point traﬃc and capacities. It is now clear how both the provider j’s
own capacity, kj, and the amount of traﬃc it generates, tj, aﬀect i’s congestion and
quality of service, thus creating an externality.
3.3.2 Traﬃc ﬂows and the level of congestion with bilateral peering
Suppose now that backbones peer only bilaterally as presented in ﬁgure 2; while
expression (5) still represents the total traﬃc on provider i’s infrastructures, the
expressions for the traﬃc at the peering point and the delay must be slightly mod-
iﬁed. With n providers there are
n(n¡1)
2 private peering points; the average total
cross traﬃc transiting through the peering point between backbone i and backbone




p;j = ®ixj + ®jxi with i 6= j; i;j = 1;:::;n: (8)
As a consequence, the average delay suﬀered by the representative customer of




















where the superscript b stays for ”bilateral”.
Clearly, when there are only two providers on the market, the multilateral and the
bilateral frameworks coincide. The formal simplicity of this case makes it possible
to analyse the equilibrium in detail; for these reasons it is useful to start the analysis
assuming n = 2. In the last part of the paper we move to the case of n = 3; three
is the smaller number of providers to distinguish between bilateral and multilateral
peering but that at the same time allows to maintain model’s tractability.
4 The duopoly benchmark
4.1 Timing and proﬁt
Investment in capacity is a long run decision; therefore it is reasonable to assume
that providers choose their capacity at the beginning of the game and compete
afterwards. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we assume that providers decide
simultaneously how much to invest in capacity for their own network and how much
12for the peering point.21 Finally, we assume that providers compete ´ a la Cournot, by
setting quantities.
With only two providers, bilateral and multilateral peering coincide. The de-
mand function faced by each provider is simply obtained by plugging (7) into (2).
For the sake of simplicity, we normalise away to zero the marginal cost of provid-
ing access to an additional customer. This assumption is taken also on practical
grounds: residential users usually connect to the Internet via the existing telecom
infrastructure (through ”dial-up” connection) and the provider does not incur any
cost of connecting the user. Business users may connect through dedicated leased
lines; although in this case the cost of connecting one more customer may be pos-
itive, this feature can be easily incorporated into the model without changing its
qualitative nature. On the contrary, providers face the cost of upgrading transmis-
sion capacity in order to improve network eﬃciency and the QoS; for simplicity we
assume the following:
Assumption 2. The cost of installing ki amount of capacity is given by
c(ki) = µki i = 1;2;p
where µ > 0 is the marginal cost of installing capacity.22
Finally, according to the collaborative nature of a peering agreement, it is natural
to assume that
Assumption 3. The capacity of the peering point kp is chosen to maximise back-
bones joint proﬁts and the cost is equally shared between the interconnecting parties.
Therefore, provider i’s proﬁt is:







where the second term represents provider’s total cost of installing capacity and it
is made of two components: the ﬁrst one is the cost of building its own capacity,
ki, while the second one is the share of the cost of the private interconnection
infrastructure which is equally divided between the two providers. Using the demand























21As it will become clear later, the solution does not change if kp is chosen once network capacities
are in place.
22Capacity is often provided by public telecommunications operators (PTOs) through leased
lines; µ can therefore be interpreted as the price charged by PTOs for a leased line of a certain
capacity.
13We solve the model by backward induction. In the second stage, competition
occurs given capacity and in the ﬁrst stage, backbones anticipate second stage equi-
librium and choose capacities.
4.2 The symmetric solution
Each provider chooses xi to maximise proﬁts; ﬁrms’ equilibrium outputs given
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where we have replaced ®1 with ® and ®2 with 1¡® to avoid cumbersome notation.23
In the ﬁrst stage, each provider decides its level of capacity ki, given rivals’ choice
kj; furthermore, the two providers decide cooperatively the capacity of the private
peering point kp. Indicating joint proﬁts with Π = ¼1 +¼2, then the solution vector
[k1;k2;kp] of ﬁrms’ choice of capacities, is the simultaneous solution of the following










While the general solution to these equations is quite complex and can be anal-
ysed only numerically, the symmetric case can be easily derived. Symmetry occurs
at the equilibrium when the two providers host the same amount of content, formally
when ® = 1=2. In the symmetric case, we prove the following:24
















¡ 2 < 0 i;j = 1;2
which are clearly satisﬁed.
24The proof of this and of all the mathematical results are in the Appendix.







> 0 i;j = 1;2:
At the symmetric equilibrium, the total amount of network capacity and the capacity




















Interestingly, network capacities are strategic complements: the more a peering
partner invests in capacity, the more capacity is installed also by the other party.
This is due to a standard ”business stealing” eﬀect. By improving its transmission
infrastructures, provider i increases its QoS; as a consequence, some consumers of
provider j now prefers to demand access to provider i. In order to protect its
proﬁts, provider j reacts to i’s investment by also improving its capacity (and QoS).
This competitive process stimulates capacity investments up to the point where the
marginal beneﬁt of additional capacity is perfectly oﬀ set by the additional cost of
installing it.
Furthermore, network and peering point capacities are also complements; they
too move together although, in this case, is not entirely correct to deﬁne them
as strategic complements given that kp is chosen in collaboration between the two
ﬁrms. This last result is interesting especially if we think to the widespread concern
among practitioners and academics about the possible trade-oﬀ facing backbones
when upgrading their networks: in terms of choosing between improving peering
capacity or network capacity, backbone may concentrate their resources on the latter
at the expense of the former (see Kende and Oxman, 1999). We have shown that
the two objectives are not necessarily one against the other.
The complementarity between ki and kp can be intuitively explained by observing
that the QoS that a single provider is able to oﬀer to its customers does not depend
only on the capacity of its network but also on both the capacity installed by the rival
and on the transmission eﬃciency of the peering point. When a backbone decides
how much transmission capacity to install, it knows that its customers will enjoy
full beneﬁts of it only if the peering point is suﬃciently eﬃcient to exchange traﬃc
without delays: the more eﬃcient the transmission through the peering point, the
stronger the incentive for each provider to expand its own network; or, equivalently,
the marginal productivity of provider i’s investment in its own capacity ki, increases
with kp.
A consequence of this observation is that any regime or regulatory policy that
provides incentives for the peering parties to invest in peering capacity may have
the positive eﬀect of stimulating a general network expansion.
154.3 The asymmetric solution
Suppose now that the two providers host a diﬀerent amount of content: ® 6= 1=2. In
this case the solution can no longer be obtained formally and we need to resort to
numerical simulations. In the following table, we present the solution for diﬀerent
degrees of asymmetry when A = 10 and µ = 1.25 The table also reports providers
proﬁts, welfare and, as a proxy for the QoS oﬀered, the amount of delay experienced
by customers of each provider.
® 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.3 0.2
k1 0.99 0.83 0.69 0.41 0.07
k2 0.99 1.16 1.34 1.76 1.75
K 1.98 1.99 2.03 2.16 1.82
kp 1.4 1.38 1.33 1.1 0.37
¼1 4.9 4.66 4.4 3.77 1.56
¼2 4.9 5.18 5.48 6.28 6.31
W 17.66 17.67 17.69 17.62 11.5
D1 2.7 2.78 2.86 3.08 4.7
D2 2.7 2.63 2.55 2.43 3.16
Table 1: bilateral peering with asymmetric content
The asymmetry between backbones very much aﬀects the equilibrium of the
model. In particular, as ® gets smaller up to a certain level of asymmetry:
1. the lower k1 and the larger k2; total own capacity K increases with the asym-
metry;
2. the lower the private peering capacity;
3. the lower provider 1 proﬁts and the larger provider 2 proﬁts;
4. the higher the welfare;
5. the worst provider 1 QoS (higher delay) and the better the QoS guaranteed
by provider 2.
These results hold true up to a certain degree of asymmetry, while for suﬃciently
small values of ® (high asymmetry), a further increase in ® induces a decrease in all
25Diﬀerent values of the parameters can be considered but the qualitative properties of the
solution are unaﬀected. Second order conditions have been checked.
16the investments in capacities, a general deterioration in the QoS for both providers
and also a fall in social welfare.
Nevertheless, the table shows that a certain degree of asymmetric content dis-
tribution may play a positive role since it induces an increases in the installed total
network capacity and despite the lower capacity of the private peering point, also
an increase in the level of welfare, at least for ® 2 (0:4;0:5) in the table.
Interestingly, the delay suﬀered on the two backbones’ infrastructures moves op-
posite than expected: the provider hosting more content, which should be therefore
more congested, at the equilibrium suﬀers less delay/congestion than the smaller
backbone. As ® moves away from 1=2, the provider hosting more content, here
provider 2, has incentives in installing more capacity while provider 1 does the op-
posite. Furthermore, as ® gets smaller, provider 2 increases its capacity more than
the reduction of the rival, thus increasing total network capacity. As a consequence,
as content is more asymmetrically distributed, the Quality of Service oﬀered by
provider 2 improves while that of provider 1 is worsened even if provider 2 handles
more traﬃc.
Consumers are willing to pay more for a better service and this translates into
higher proﬁts for provider 2; ﬁnally, the overall impact on welfare is also positive.
This analysis does not contemplate the possibility that providers do not actu-
ally reach a private agreement; this would require to model a ”disagreement point”
due to lack of interconnection. As previously discussed, backbones usually decide
to set a private peering point when they are ”similar in size”. Nevertheless, as
shown in Besen et al. (2001), private peering might be the equilibrium outcome
of the bargaining process between Internet providers also when they have diﬀerent
size and capacity. A peering agreement is reached when parties gain equally from
interconnection. This may happen also when providers are not symmetric: lack of
interconnection means service degradation for both providers since their reciprocal
traﬃc must transit through the congested public peering point. A lower QoS implies
less per customer revenues, due to lower individual willingness to pay, and therefore
lower proﬁts for both backbones. Under some circumstances, these losses are iden-
tical for both parties: while without agreement the smaller provider loses more per
customer, the larger provider suﬀers a smaller loss but over a larger customer base.
Besen al. (2001) show that this happens when the individual beneﬁt is linear in
the QoS, as it is in our case; in this scenario, private interconnection is an equilibrium
outcome also between asymmetric providers.
5 The model with three providers
To distinguish between bilateral and multilateral peering we need at least three
providers; things get very complicated, nevertheless we are still able to solve the
17model at least numerically and to compare the diﬀerent scenarios. Let us start with
multilateral peering.
5.1 Multilateral peering
With three providers, traﬃc and delay for provider i are given in (5), (6) and (7).
The cost of installing the peering infrastructure is equally shared between the three
rivals; therefore backbone i’s proﬁt is:






where pi is the demand function given in (2).
Proposition 2. At the symmetric equilibrium (®i = 1=3) with multilateral peering
between 3 backbones, the total amount of network capacity and the capacity of the




















Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, the following corollary easily fol-
lows:
Corollary 1 (Under-investment). With multilateral peering, total network ca-
pacity decreases with the degree of market competition:
Kjn=2 > Kjn=3
The eﬀect of enhanced competition on the capacity of the peering point is ambiguous:





Contrary to Varian and MacKie-Mason (1995), total transmission capacity de-
creases with competition. This result is not surprising in this set up and it is due
to a standard ”public good” argument. The negative externality related to con-
gestion induces ﬁrms to under-invest in network capacity and this is true although
capacities are strategic complements. On the one side, strategic interactions push
investments up; on the other side ﬁrms tend to behave opportunistically decreasing
their investment in capacity as the market becomes more competitive. Corollary 1
shows that this second eﬀect dominates.
18The impact of higher competition on the capacity of the common interconnection
point is diﬀerent; in this case, if the cost of capacity is not too big, then three
backbones tend to invest in the multilateral peering point more than two. Clearly,
under-investment is less severe at the peering given that kp is chosen in collaboration
between providers.
Never the less, the under-investment in K dominates and the overall impact of
higher competition on the delay/QoS of transmission is clear; to evaluate this, we
































































It is easy to verify that when there are only two providers the quality of service
is higher than when there are three active ﬁrms: Dijn=2 < Dijn=3.
The most relevant consequence of under-investment is that competition may
harm welfare; competition reduces prices and increases output and, therefore, wel-
fare; nevertheless this positive eﬀect may be more than oﬀset by the negative welfare
eﬀect of higher congestion due to the lower amount of transmission capacity.
5.2 Bilateral peering
When peering occurs only bilaterally, we are in the framework presented in ﬁgure
2 in which each backbone peers with all the others in the market. With three
providers, there are three peering points. Traﬃc and delay are given in expressions
(8) and (9). Provider i’s proﬁt is:









Competition occurs in the second stage, once capacities are in place; this stage
is identical to the previous case. The diﬀerence here lyes in the ﬁrst stage when each
provider chooses its network capacity, ki, to maximise its own proﬁts and also sets
the capacity of the peering point, ki
p;j, together with each peering partner j.
Unfortunately, in this case we are not able to solve the model formally not
even in the symmetric case; the maximisation problem is still well behaved but
19the solution can be obtained only numerically. The following table presents the
symmetric solution for A = 10 and µ = 1:26
bilateral multilateral duopoly
ki 0.44 0.37 0.99
K 1.32 1.11 1.98
kp 2.49 1.29 1.58
¼i 2.03 1.99 4.9
W 13.42 11.56 17.67
Di 3.58 4.15 2.7
Table 2: bilateral vs multilateral peering.
For easiness of comparison, table 2 also reports the solution values in the multi-
lateral peering case and in the duopoly case.
Comparing the ﬁrst two columns, it is apparent that the solution with bilateral
peering is better than the multilateral one in all respects: providers install more ca-
pacity, this reduces the average delay suﬀered on their networks and both proﬁts and
welfare are higher than with multilateral peering. Finally, comparing the bilateral
solution with the duopoly case, it is clear that the negative congestion externality
induces under-investment also when providers peer bilaterally, although the overall
impact on capacity investment and QoS is less severe than with multilateral peering.
6 Two further extensions
We end the paper presenting two further extensions of the basic duopoly model. In
the ﬁrst one we study the impact of product diﬀerentiation on backbones incentives
to invest in capacity while in the last section we propose a simple rule to ameliorate
the under-investment problem based on a settlement payment between providers.
6.1 Horizontal product diﬀerentiation
So far we have assumed intrinsic homogeneity between providers’ products and ser-
vices; eventually, in the asymmetric equilibrium, (quality) diﬀerentiation occurs due
to diﬀerent degrees of congestion and QoS. In the reality, providers can diﬀerentiate




20their products in many respects, for example through the supply of diﬀerent cus-
tomer services, or through diﬀerent oﬀerings in terms of enhanced emails services or
ﬁdelity programs.
Consider again the duopoly benchmark; following Bowley (1924), when back-
bones oﬀer horizontally diﬀerentiated services, then we can generalise the inverse
demand faced by backbone i as follows:
pi = A ¡ Di ¡ (xi + °xj) i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (15)
where 0 · ° · 1 measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation between providers:
the lower °, the more consumers ﬁnd the products to be diﬀerent; if ° = 0, the
two products are independent in demand while as ° approaches to 1, the varieties
become closer and closer substitutes.
We have solved the model for diﬀerent degrees of product diﬀerentiation; in
order to isolate the impact of intrinsic product diﬀerentiation from that due to
(vertical) quality diﬀerentiation and congestion, we have solved for the symmetric
equilibrium by assuming identical content shares across the two providers (® = 1=2).
The following table presents the numerical solutions of the model for A=10 and µ=1.
° 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5
ki 0.99 1.06 1.14 1.22 1.43
K 1.98 2.12 2.27 2.44 2.86
kp 1.4 1.45 1.61 1.73 2.02
¼i 4.9 5.26 5.64 6.08 7.15
W 17.66 19.13 20.8 22.69 27.3
Di 2.7 2.65 2.6 2.54 2.42
Table 3: the solution with product diﬀerentiation
As expected, provider proﬁts increase the more the products are diﬀerentiated;
furthermore diﬀerentiation stimulates capacity investment, both at the peering level
and at the level of each single provider. Interestingly, product diﬀerentiation in-
duces a decrease in providers’ congestion, with a better QoS the more customers
perceive products as diﬀerent.27 The more products are diﬀerentiated, the more the
27It must be noted that in a model of product diﬀerentiation ”´ a la Bowley”, the overall size of
the market increases with the number of varieties and with the degree of product substitutability.
If ° = 0, varieties are independent in demand and adding an additional variety amounts to adding
a completely new market. Therefore, the results on capacity, proﬁts and welfare of a decrease
of ° must be considered with caution. On the contrary, the positive eﬀect of diﬀerentiation on
networks’ delay can be fully accepted given that Di measures the Quality of Service relatively to
the total aggregate demand.
21two markets can be viewed as separated entities, although providers are still fully
interconnected, and therefore the weaker the ﬁrms incentives to behave opportunis-
tically.
From this numerical simulation, product diﬀerentiation seems to play a role
very much similar to that played by the asymmetry in content shares; indeed, a
diﬀerence in the amount of content/web sites hosted by networks determines, at
the equilibrium, diﬀerent degrees of congestion across ﬁrms and as a consequence a
diﬀerentiation in the quality of access services. Therefore the similarity between the
equilibrium impact of these two forms of diﬀerentiation is not surprising.
6.2 A simple proposal: a reciprocal investment capacity fee
So far, according to the commonly observed practice between backbones, we have
assumed that providers exchange traﬃc at the peering point for free, in a ”bill-and-
keep” fashion. The main message resulting from the previous pages is that, in the
presence of a negative congestion externality, this form of interconnection induces a
sub-optimal level of investment in capacity.
As clearly discussed, this form of interconnection has become very popular among
providers for its simplicity and easiness of implementation; nevertheless this simplic-
ity may also result in strong welfare losses and quality degradation. From microe-
conomic theory, we know that a way to get out of this Pareto ineﬃciency, can be
obtained by allowing side payments between parties.
In this framework, a side payment is simply an interconnection fee payed by each
provider for being interconnected to rival’s network through the peering point. One





where each backbone pays to the rival a fee for interconnecting at the peering point
which is decreasing with its own installed capacity.28 This fee is simple and it is
based on backbones’ capacities which, contrary to traﬃc, can be easily observed,
measured and veriﬁed by the interconnecting parties.
If such a payment is introduced in the duopoly benchmark, ﬁrm i’s proﬁt be-
comes:












The game remains symmetric; this implies that at the equilibrium what a
provider pays for interconnection is identical to what it receives from the rival:
28Note that the term ”interconnection fee” may be inappropriate since it is not a fee for handling
traﬃc but simply a payment to enter the peering arrangement.
22settlement payments cancel each other out and equilibrium proﬁts are not aﬀected
by them. Nevertheless, although backbones do not make or loose money on inter-
connection, the presence of a fee alters their investment strategies and consequently
the equilibrium.
Also in this case to solve the ﬁrst stage capacity game, we need to resort numerical
simulations; the following table compares the solution of the duopoly game with and








Table 4: the solution with interconnection fee
From this table clearly emerges that the introduction of a reciprocal payment
which is negatively related to the installed capacity may have a positive eﬀect on
capacities, proﬁts, welfare and the quality of service. The fee plays the role of
a coordinating mechanism that induces backbones to invest more in capacity. In
other words, an interconnection fee which is negatively related to providers’ capacity
moves the solution of the game towards a Pareto superior outcome where both ﬁrms
and consumers are better oﬀ.
7 Conclusion
We have developed a model to study the relationship between interconnection and
congestion on the Internet. This is a particularly interesting issue which impor-
tance is growing as the demand for bandwidth on the Internet increases. We have
extended a recent framework proposed by Dewan et al. (2000) in order to analyse
ﬁrms’ incentives to upgrade their capacities and the capacity of peering points un-
der diﬀerent interconnection structures and when the degree of market competition
changes.
The framework takes full account of the impact of negative network external-
ities due to congestion by explicitly modeling on-net and oﬀ-net traﬃc such that
the degrees of congestion across backbones are correlated. Our main message is
that under-investment occurs at the equilibrium: congestion induces ﬁrms to invest
23less than the optimal level and this sub-optimality gets stronger as market compe-
tition increases; this is true both when ﬁrms agree to peer multilaterally and when
they peer only bilaterally, although in this case under-investment appears to be less
severe.
We also study ﬁrms’ investment decisions when they oﬀer diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts. Product diﬀerentiation may occur in two ways: through asymmetric content
distribution which aﬀects equilibrium quality of service or, more simply, because
ﬁrms oﬀer horizontally diﬀerentiated products. In both cases, diﬀerentiation may
stimulate ﬁrms’ capacity investments thus reducing congestion.
A way to ameliorate congestion due to under-investment, is by allowing side pay-
ments between ﬁrms which can take the form of reciprocal interconnection charges;
we show that when each provider pays the rival for interconnection a fee negatively
related to its capacity, then ﬁrms invest more in capacity and the model converges
towards a Pareto superior outcome.
The model is very simple and it is only a starting point for further developments.
A ﬁrst extension would be to take full account of the characteristics of the bargaining
process, considering the impact on the ﬁnal outcome of uneven bargaining power
between providers; this would imply, for example, the possibility that the parties
sign a transit rather than a peering agreement. This will be discussed in future
research.
24Appendix
Proof. of Proposition 1. To solve for the symmetric equilibrium, rewrite the system of
ﬁrst order conditions (10), (11) and (12) imposing ®1 = ®2 = 1=2; in this case, expressions
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Solving for ki and kp, the solution given in the proposition follows.
The above expressions (18) describe the strategic interactions in networks and peering
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(kikp + kikj + kjkp + 4kjkpki)
3 < 0
which are always satisﬁed for positive values of ki, kj and kp.
Proof. of Proposition 2. As before, the solution is obtained by backward induction: we
ﬁrst derive the cournot equilibrium outputs in the second stage and then, plugging the
25obtained outputs into the proﬁt functions, we solve for capacities.29 In the symmetric case,












































kjkpki + 4kjkski + kjkskp + kikpks + 9kjkpkiks
￿2 = 0
with i;j;s = 1;2;3 and where Π =
P3
i=1 ¼i. Rearranging these conditions and solving for
capacities, the proposition follows.























(4kjkski + kjkpks + kpkski + kikpkj + 9kjkpkiks)
3 < 0
which clearly are always satisﬁed.
29For the sake of brevity, we omit to present the second stage Cournot outputs given capacities;
these results are available on request.
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